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Abstract
Optimal patent breadth is an issue that is still being vigorously debated at both
the theoretical and empirical levels. This paper analyzes optimal patent policy in the
context of cumulative innovation in a model that endogenizes the patenting decisions of
early innovators. In the theoretical literature on cumulative innovation, it is generally
assumed that all innovations are patented. However, studies such as Cohen et al. (2000)
and Levin et al. (1987) report that ﬁrms frequently rely on secrecy to protect their
discoveries. Cumulative innovation implies that innovators may have signiﬁcant incentives
to keep their innovations secret to get a head start in subsequent R&D races. This
paper shows that if innovators cannot rely on secrecy to protect their innovations, it is
optimal to have relatively narrow patent protection. This happens if the government has
a weak trade secret policy or if innovators cannot monitor the ﬂow of their technological
information. This is because when innovators cannot rely on secrecy to protect their
innovations, they have increased incentives to patent them and it is not necessary for the
government to give them extra incentives to patent. In the case when innovators always
prefer secrecy over patenting, it becomes optimal to have a ﬂexible antitrust policy rather
than a ﬂexible patent policy. Since non-disclosure reduces the investment incentives in the
second R&D race, allowing collusive licensing agreements between competing innovators
becomes optimal in order to stimulate investment in the second R&D race.
JEL Classiﬁcation: O31, O38, L40
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Recent developments in the economic theories of innovation have challenged the notion that
innovations are isolated events and emphasized the cumulative nature of innovation. The
cumulative nature of innovation implies that the social value of innovations should include
the value of subsequent innovations they inspire. This has signiﬁcant implications for optimal
patent design, especially optimal patent breadth. Hence, one of the main issues addressed in
the cumulative innovation literature is how patent policy can be designed so as to divide the
proﬁts between sequential innovators in a way that provides them with optimal incentives
to invest. Several papers have argued for broad patent protection in order to overcome the
externality that exists between diﬀerent generations of innovators.1 One exception is Denicolo
(2000). In a two-stage patent race framework, he shows that having broad protection may
not always be optimal.
The theoretical debate over optimal patent policy has signiﬁcant policy implications.
Patent protection in the United States has become much stronger over the last two decades
as a result of some recent reforms. The success of these reforms in stimulating innovation has
been called into question in several empirical papers.2 Therefore, the desirability of broad
patent protection is an issue that is still being vigorously debated at both the theoretical and
empirical levels.
In the theoretical literature on cumulative innovation, it is generally assumed that all
innovations are patented. This paper challenges this assumption. I show that having broad
1See Scotchmer (1991 and 1996), Green and Scotchmer (1995), Chang (1995), and Matutes, Regibeau and
Rockett (1996). Gallini and Scotchmer (2001) contains an excellent survey of the diﬀerent approaches to the
problem of optimal patent breadth.
2See Gallini (2002) for an excellent discussion of the eﬀectiveness of patent protection and the recent patent
reforms in the United States. Schankerman (1998) and Lanjouw (1998) ﬁnd that patent protection is not the
major source of private returns to R&D. Hall and Ziedonis (2001), and Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001) argue
that stronger patent protection have resulted in socially wasteful patent portfolio races instead of stimulating
innovation.
2patent protection may not always be optimal if we take into account the fact that innovators
choose between several mechanisms, including patents and trade secrecy, to protect their
innovations. In fact, studies such as Cohen et al. (2000) and Levin et al. (1987) report that
ﬁrms frequently rely on secrecy to protect their discoveries. Speciﬁcally, Cohen et al. (2000)
ﬁnd that patents tend to be the least preferred protection mechanism by ﬁrms while secrecy
a n dl e a dt i m et e n dt ob et h em o s th e a v i l yu s e do n e s . 3 Moreover, by comparing their results
with those of Levin et al. (1987), Cohen et al. (2000) conclude that there is an apparent
growth in the importance of secrecy as an appropriability mechanism and a decline in the
importance of patents. The importance of secrecy is further supported by Lerner (1994) who
ﬁnds that 43% of all intellectual property litigation cases involve trade secrets.
The cumulative nature of innovation implies that early innovators may have signiﬁcant
incentives to keep their innovations secret to get a head start in subsequent R&D races. In
an environment where ﬁrms compete to come up with improved versions of current products,
the proﬁts of early innovators can be signiﬁcantly reduced if the following race is won by
one of the rival ﬁrms. This is especially true under a policy of narrow patent protection.
When early innovators prefer secrecy over patenting, the dynamics of subsequent R&D races
change substantially since non-disclosure of early innovations can severely aﬀect the invest-
ment incentives of rival ﬁrms in subsequent R&D races. Therefore, the analysis of optimal
intellectual property policy should take into account the possibility that early innovators may
hinder the pace of innovation by delaying the disclosure of their innovations.4
Does this mean that the government should have a policy of broad patent protection in
order to encourage patenting? The two goals of the patent system are to encourage research
3According to their study, especially in case of product innovations, ﬁrms report that they use secrecy to
protect just over 50% of their innovations.
4In this paper, I assume that patents have inﬁnite duration and analyze the eﬀect of patent breadth on
innovators’ disclosure incentives. Innovators’ disclosure incentives could also be analyzed in a model where
patent length is the critical policy instrument.
3and development, and to promote the disclosure of innovations. The analysis of optimal policy
so far has mainly focused on the ﬁrst goal while this paper aims to draw attention to the
second goal as well. Both a ﬂexible patent policy and a ﬂexible antitrust policy, which allows
collusion between winners of two subsequent races, can potentially play a role in encouraging
disclosure through patenting. The results of this paper reveal that in cases when secrecy is
not a viable option, it is optimal to have relatively narrow patent protection. Moreover, there
may be cases when patent policy is completely ineﬀective in achieving the two goals of the
patent system and when it is optimal to have a tolerant antitrust policy instead.
The model consists of two consecutive R&D races as in Denicolo (2000).5 The ﬁrms race
to achieve two symmetric and competing innovations, and the winner of the ﬁrst race can also
participate in the second R&D race. At the end of the ﬁrst race, the winner decides whether
to patent the innovation or keep it a secret. Under the patent law, an applicant is required to
disclose suﬃcient knowledge about the innovation in order to enable someone skilled in the art
to make and use all the embodiments of the innovation claimed in the patent. Therefore, the
winner of the ﬁrst race may be reluctant to patent in order not to reveal crucial technological
information to the rival ﬁrms. After observing the patenting decision of the innovator, ﬁrms
invest to develop an improved version in the second R&D race. If the ﬁrst innovation is not
disclosed, the rival ﬁrms must spend resources to gain information about it or to re-invent it,
which reduces their competitiveness in the second R&D race.6
5Although the literature on cumulative innovations is quite extensive, it has generally been assumed that
there is no racing in the development of the innovations and that each innovation is developed by a diﬀerent
ﬁrm. This may be a realistic assumption to make especially if the second-generation product is an application
of the ﬁrst innovation. However, in many cases in the real world, where the second-generation product is an
improvement of the ﬁrst innovation, it may not be realistic to assume that initial innovators do not invest to
improve their products. One paper that allows for competition in the R&D stage and repeated innovation by
the same ﬁrm is Denicolo (2000).
6I ft h ei n n o v a t o rc h o o s e st ok e e pt h ei n n o v a t i o nas e c r e t ,o n ei s s u et h a ta r i s e si sw h a th a p p e n si ft h e
innovation is independently re-invented. In the United States, ownership is determined by the ﬁrst-to-invent
rule, which is what I assume in this paper. In most of the other countries, the ﬁrst-to-ﬁle rule applies. Section
6b r i e ﬂy discusses how a switch to the ﬁrst-to-ﬁle rule may aﬀect optimal policy.
4The three domains of policy that inﬂuence the patenting decisions of innovators are patent
policy, antitrust policy, and trade secret policy. In the context of sequentially developed
competing innovations, the eﬀective life of a patent is determined by how the courts interpret
the patent and antitrust laws.7 On the other hand, the government’s trade secret policy
determines the amount of protection innovators get against theft and unauthorized disclosure
of their trade secrets. Following Chang (1995), I compare the behavioral implications and
welfare properties of three diﬀerent policy regimes. The courts ﬁrst decide whether the
innovation in question violates the patent of an earlier innovation. After deciding whether
there is infringement, the courts can further decide whether to allow the ﬁrms to enter
collusive agreements in case of no infringement. Such collusive agreements may increase
the investment incentives of innovators by eliminating the competition between holders of
competing but non-infringing patents. Focusing on the patenting decisions of innovators
allows us to draw conclusions about the relationship between optimal patent and antitrust
policy, and trade secret policy.
The results indicate that optimal patent protection depends on how viable an option
secrecy is. Speciﬁcally, I ﬁnd that if the government has a weak trade secret policy or if
innovators cannot monitor the ﬂow of their technological information, it may not be optimal
to have strong patent protection. In other words, it is optimal to have relatively narrow
7The domain of patent policy cannot be isolated from the domain of antitrust policy since the ways in
which patents are exploited by ﬁrms may give rise to antitrust concerns. For example, competing ﬁrms may
use horizontal agreements regarding patents in order to restrict the prices they are going to charge in the
product market. Or, they can give monopoly power to a single ﬁrm by selling all their competing patents
to that ﬁrm. Historically, ﬁnding the right balance between the two areas of law has been an important
policy question. The Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, i s s u e dj o i n t l yb yt h e
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), describes generally how the agencies
will handle various forms of licensing deals that may contain anti-competitive provisions. See Tom (1998)
and Pitofsky (2000) for recent comments on the purposes of intellectual property law and antitrust law. See
also FTC Chairman Pitofsky’s speech, ”Antitrust and Intellectual Property: Unresolved Issues at the Heart
of the New Economy,” March 2, 2001, available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/ipf301.htm, and the
former Deputy Assistant Attorney General Joseph Farrell’s speech, ”Thoughts on Antitrust and Innovation,”
January 25, 2001, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/7402.htm.
5patent protection, as in Denicolo (2000), if innovators cannot rely on secrecy to protect their
innovations. This is because as the rival ﬁrm’s probability of success in case of no patenting
increases, innovating ﬁrms have increased incentives to patent their innovations. Therefore,
the government may ﬁnd it optimal to lower the degree of patent protection in order to
encourage investment in the second R&D race. If, on the other hand, there is strong trade
secret policy or innovators can monitor the ﬂow of their technological information, then the
rivals’ probability of success in case of no patenting is relatively low and the government may
ﬁnd it optimal to have broad patent protection in order to encourage patenting.
Regarding antitrust policy, I ﬁnd that having a ﬂexible antitrust policy is justiﬁed only in
cases when early innovators will always prefer to keep their innovations secret. If early inno-
vators cannot be encouraged to disclose their innovations under any of the policy regimes, it is
optimal have a ﬂexible antitrust policy in order to encourage investment in subsequent R&D
races. Non-disclosure of early innovations decreases the investment incentives of subsequent
investors. Since second-generation innovators have the strongest incentives to invest when
the courts ﬁnd no infringement and allow collusion, it becomes optimal to allow collusive
licensing agreements between competing innovators if there will be no patenting by early
innovators under any of the policy regimes.
Thus, the paper makes a clear case for when it helps to have a lenient antitrust policy in
order to protect intellectual property by taking innovators’ decisions to patent into account.
Chang (1995) argues that collusive licensing agreements should be allowed only under very
limited circumstances, namely when the relative value of the second innovation is very high,
while Priest (1977) and Kaplow (1984) oppose such collusive licensing on the grounds that
such antitrust policy rewards innovation at an excessive social cost. This paper argues that
there may be room for ﬂexible antitrust policy if early innovators are likely to rely on secrecy
rather than the patent system to protect their innovations.
6Other papers that also focus on the issue of disclosure of early innovations are Matutes
et al. (1996), Scotchmer and Green (1990), Gallini (1992), and Horstmann et al. (1985).
Matutes et al. (1996), in contrast with this paper, consider disclosure issues in case of non-
competing innovations. In their model, owners of fundamental innovations may be reluctant
to commercialize their innovations in order to get a head start in developing applications
of their new discoveries. They compare two types of patent protection regimes, “length”
and “scope” protection, and conclude that policy-makers should target “scope” protection
in order to eliminate the socially undesirable waiting period. Scotchmer and Green (1990)
explore how stringent the novelty requirement in patent law, which aﬀects the amount of
technical information disclosed among ﬁrms, should be. This paper, in contrast, analyzes
how broad patent protection should be and whether collusive agreements should be allowed.8
Gallini (1992) analyzes patent policy in the context of costly imitation. In contrast with this
paper, she allows imitation to take place both under patenting and no patenting. While I
argue for narrower patent protection if the probability of imitation is high, she argues for
broad patent protection in order to prevent imitation. Horstmann et al. (1985) investigate
the patenting decisions of ﬁrms in case of a single R&D race while I consider the patenting
decisions of ﬁrms in case of sequential R&D races.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model and discusses the assumptions
made regarding the legal background. In Section 3, I analyze the private incentives of the
ﬁrms and explore what the optimal patent policy is. Section 4 concludes the paper. All
proofs are in the Appendix.
8There are two legal instruments that determine the degree of protection that early innovators get. First,
the novelty requirement determines how large subsequent innovations have to be in order to be patentable.
Second, even if it is patentable, the courts may still decide that the second innovation infringes the patent of
the ﬁrst innovation. O’Donoghue et al. (1998) refer to the second instrument as a patent’s leading breadth.
This paper focuses on the second instrument while Scotchmer and Green (1990) focuses on the ﬁrst one.
72M o d e l
2.1 Research environment and consumers
The research environment is adapted from Denicolo (2000). There are two sequential R&D
races and free entry into each race. The size of each innovation is exogenously given and
commonly known, but its timing is stochastic. For simplicity, I assume the two innovations
are symmetric in terms of both their private and social values. The winner of the ﬁrst race
can participate in the second race, so the model allows for repeated innovation by the same
ﬁrm. If the winner of the second race is diﬀerent from the winner of the ﬁrst race, the second
innovator can obtain a patent for the technology and start using it provided that either the
new technology does not infringe the patent of the old technology or the ﬁrms are able to
make a licensing deal.9
The R&D game is modeled using a Poisson discovery process. Following Loury (1979),
it is assumed that at the beginning of each race, participant i pays a lump sum amount
equal to cxi,w h e r ec is the per-unit R&D cost and xi is the R&D eﬀort level chosen by the
ﬁrm. I assume the hazard function is linear. Both the Poisson and the linear hazard function
assumptions are made in order to make the model tractable. The common social and private
discount rate is represented by r.
Once an R&D race ends and the innovation is successfully developed, the good can be
produced at zero marginal cost. There is a mass of consumers with homogeneous preferences.
They buy at most one unit of the good.10 I assume a model of successive market domination
similar to Scotchmer and Green (1990). Each innovation has a market value of v.F i r m s
9Whether the second innovation should be patentable or not is a policy question that I do not consider
in this paper. I assume the second innovation is always patentable. In cases when it is not, the bargain-
ing powers of second-generation innovators may be signiﬁcantly reduced. See Scotchmer and Green (1990),
Scotchmer (1996), Denicolo (2000), and Denicolo and Zanchettin (2002) for optimal policy regarding the
novelty requirement.
10Due to this assumption of inelastic demand, monopoly pricing in case of collusion does not result in any
deadweight loss.
8compete by setting prices. If the same ﬁrm is the owner of both of the innovations or
if the ﬁrms sign a collusive licensing agreement, the proﬁti s2v per unit of time. If two
diﬀerent ﬁr m sw i nt h et w or a c e sa n dt h eﬁrms have to compete, the proﬁts are given by 0
and v respectively. The consumers are willing to pay v for the basic version and 2v for the
improved version of the product. Bertrand competition drives the price of the basic version
to zero and that of the improved version to v minus some inﬁnitesimal amount.
The sequence of events is as follows. At the beginning of the ﬁrst R&D race, after the
government announces its intellectual property protection policy, ﬁrms simultaneously decide
how much to invest in order to develop the ﬁrst innovation. The race ends when one of the
participants successfully develops the innovation. The winner of the race decides whether to
patent the innovation. In accordance with the goals of the patent system, I assume patenting
means immediate full disclosure.11 In other words, once an innovation is patented, the rival
ﬁrms in the industry can easily build on it.12,13 Therefore, if there is patenting, the hazard
rates of the ﬁrms in the second R&D race are given by λxw and λxi,w h e r exw represents
the investment of the winner of the ﬁrst race in the second race. If there is no patenting,
the innovator’s hazard rate is λxw while the rival ﬁrms’ hazard rate is µxi,w h e r eλ ≥ µ.
If the innovation is kept a secret, rival ﬁrms can still learn about it through means such
as employee mobility, informal communications between the employees of the ﬁrms, and
espionage. Two factors determine whether innovators can protect themselves against such
unauthorized disclosure of their innovations: the strength of the existing trade secret policy
and the eﬀectiveness of their own monitoring eﬀorts. The magnitude of µ,w h i c hi st h e
11I assume that all patent applications are immediately disclosed to the public. In a more detailed analysis of
the patenting process, it is necessary to diﬀerentiate between the time the innovator ﬁles a patent application,
the time it becomes publicly available, and the time the patent is granted, if at all. Currently, in the United
States, all patent applications are made available to the public 18 months after they are ﬁled.
12That is, there is no learning by doing.
13I assume that even if an innovation is not patented, rival ﬁrms in the industry learn about its achievement
with no time lag. According to Mansﬁeld (1985), information about a new product or a process leaks out
within about a year.
9marginal beneﬁto ft h er i v a lﬁrms’ R&D eﬀorts in case of non-disclosure, depends on these
two factors. Clearly, the ﬁrst innovator’s decision to patent is shaped by the magnitude of µ.
After the innovator decides whether to patent or not, the ﬁrms simultaneously choose
how much to invest in the second R&D race. At the end of the second R&D race, the winner
always patents since we assume the innovation is patentable and the winner does not lose
anything by patenting. Finally, the ﬁrms compete in the product market by choosing prices.
2.2 Patent policy
Through its choice of policy, the government can aﬀect the division of proﬁts between diﬀerent
generations of innovators. I assume that the government can commit to a particular policy.
The expected proﬁts of ﬁrms depends on the speciﬁcs of that policy.
According to current patent law, if a second ﬁrm develops an improvement on a patented
innovation and patents it, and if the courts ﬁnd an infringement between the two sequential
innovations, then the two ﬁrms end up holding “blocking patents.” That is, if the courts
ﬁnd infringement (I), neither the ﬁrst nor the second innovator can use the improved version
without the other’s permission. In such cases, the ﬁrms are allowed to maximize their joint
proﬁts.14 This policy regime provides the ﬁrst innovator with the broadest patent protection.
If the courts do not ﬁnd infringement (NI), they can either allow the ﬁrms to collude in the
product market or they can ask them to compete. In other words, after deciding whether
there is infringement, the courts can further decide whether to allow the ﬁrms to enter
collusive agreements in case of no infringement. Such collusive agreements may increase
the investment incentives of innovators by eliminating the competition between holders of
competing but non-infringing patents. Thus, we may have either a policy of no infringement
14The purpose of patent protection is to give the patentholder a monopoly over the innovation covered
by the patent. Legally, if the court decides that there is infringement, both the original innovation and the
improvement are covered by the patent. Therefore, the courts maintain that the patentholder has the right
to a monopoly over both of the products. I thank Howard Chang for making this point clear for me.
10and collusion (NIC), or a policy of no infringement and no collusion (NINC). Clearly, the
incentives to invest in the ﬁrst R&D race are the highest under regime I while the incentives
to invest in the second R&D race are the highest under regime NIC. If the courts rule that
there is no infringement, the winner of the second race does not have to share its proﬁts from
the second innovation with the ﬁrst innovator. If they furthermore allow collusive licensing
agreements, the second innovator gets half of the surplus that the consumers would enjoy
otherwise.
If the ﬁrst innovator does not patent the innovation and continues to work on it, the
ﬁrst-to-invent rule in the United States allows the innovator to claim ownership in case
of independent re-invention.15 This implies that early innovators can strategically delay
patenting of their innovations in an eﬀort to get a head start in the second race without
losing their right to patent. One important issue is whether the ﬁrst innovator will use the
innovation for commercial purposes if it chooses not to patent. If there is patenting, since
commercialization could not result in any additional information leakage, the innovators
would choose to oﬀer the innovation for sale immediately. If there is no patenting, public
disclosure of innovations signiﬁcantly restricts the patenting rights of the original innovators.
In the United States, innovators have a one-year grace period during which they can apply
for a patent after they publicly disclose their innovations in any way. I assume that the
length of the grace period is negligible compared to the expected duration of the R&D races.
I also assume that reverse engineering is easy to achieve and that commercial use results in
the same amount of information leakage as patenting.16 This assumption implies that if an
15Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g), a person is entitled to a patent unless ”before such person’s invention thereof,
the invention was made in this country by another inventor who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed
it.” When an innovation should be regarded as abandoned, suppressed, or concealed is an issue that the courts
have not been able to deﬁne with any level of precision. The prevailing view seems to be that if an innovator
can prove that it is the ﬁrst inventor and continues to work on the innovation even though it does not patent
it, the innovation should not be considered abandoned, suppressed, or concealed.
16Section 4 contains a brief discussion of the implications of relaxing this assumption.
11innovator does not patent an innovation but oﬀers it for sale, the rival ﬁrms will have the
same hazard rate as in the case of patenting. Therefore, the ﬁrst innovator will always prefer
patenting to not patenting if it is going to commercialize the product, and we will always
have no commercialization under no patenting.
In the following analysis, we are interested in ﬁnding the subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
Therefore, we start from the second R&D race and work backwards.
3A n a l y s i s
3.1 Second race
3.1.1 Patenting
I ft h ep o l i c yr e g i m ei sI,t h eﬁrst innovator can make a positive proﬁte v e ni fi tl o s e st h e
second race. The second innovator has exclusive rights to the second innovation, but it cannot
use it without making a licensing agreement with the ﬁrst innovator. If the ﬁrms can reach an
agreement, the second innovation can be sold at a price of 2v, which is the maximum amount
the consumers are willing to pay for the product. If the ﬁrms cannot reach an agreement, the
ﬁrst innovator will continue to sell the ﬁrst innovation at a price of v. I assume the parties
have equal bargaining power and divide the surplus to be shared, v, equally. Therefore, if
the ﬁrst innovator loses the second race, it can still earn v
2 in addition to what it can make
on its own without reaching an agreement with the second innovator. If it wins the second
race, it earns 2v.
Let π
P/I
w stand for the expected proﬁts of the winner of the ﬁr s tr a c ew h e ni tp a t e n t sa n d





































i xi represents the aggregate investment of all other ﬁrms, which are assumed
to be symmetric, and X2 = Xo+ xw represents the aggregate investment in the second race.
To get the aggregate investment level, we can simply add the individual investment levels
since the research eﬀorts of diﬀerent ﬁrms are assumed to be independent of each other. The
innovator maximizes π
P/I
w with respect to xw. Setting the ﬁrst order condition equal to zero
gives us the following condition.17
λv (λXo +2 r)
2cr
=( λX2 + r)
2 .( 2 )
If one of the rival ﬁrms wins the second race, it earns v



















Under symmetry, each rival ﬁrm maximizes π
P/I
i with respect to xi. Since there is free entry
into the R&D race, the equilibrium individual investment levels and number of ﬁrms can be
determined by solving the ﬁrst order condition of the innovator, the ﬁrst order condition of
a generic rival ﬁrm, and the zero proﬁt condition simultaneously. Since we are interested in
ﬁguring out the aggregate investment of all rival ﬁrms, we can simply use the zero proﬁtc o n -
dition to determine the rival ﬁrms’ aggregate best response to the ﬁrst innovator’s investment









Under policy regime NIC, the courts do not ﬁnd an infringement but still allow the two
winners, which hold competing patents, to collude in the product market. If the ﬁrms do
not collude, the price competition between the ﬁrms drives the price of the ﬁrst innovation
to zero and the price of the second innovation to v minus some inﬁnitesimal amount. If
the ﬁrms decide to collude, they can charge 2v instead of v for the improved version. This
17It is straightforward to check that the second order condition is met.
13implies that if a rival ﬁrm wins the second race, the ﬁrst innovator receives v
2 and the second
innovator receives v + v
2. Thus, the second innovator receives half of the market value of the
ﬁrst innovation in addition to the market value of the second innovation. The ﬁrst innovator,
on the other hand, receives much less than what it receives under policy regime I if it loses
the second R&D race. If the ﬁrst innovator wins the second race, it earns 2v.





























respectively. Due to free entry, we can set π
P/NIC
i =0and solve for Xo. Substituting for Xo
in the ﬁrst innovator’s ﬁrst order condition, we ﬁnd that the ﬁrst order condition is always










2 .C o m p a r e dt or e g i m eI,t h e
rival ﬁrms have substantially increased incentives to invest since their bargaining power is
higher. When the courts rule that there is no infringement, the winner of the second race
does not have to share the proﬁts from the improved version of the product with the ﬁrst
innovator. The ﬁrst innovator, on the other hand, faces a higher chance of losing in the
second R&D race. Since it will still earn v
2r even if it loses, it prefers not to invest at all.
Finally, under policy regime NINC, the courts do not ﬁnd an infringement and they
do not allow the ﬁrms to collude in the product market. The ﬁrst innovator does not earn
anything if it loses the second race. The winner of the second race, if diﬀerent from the
winner of the ﬁrst race, receives v, the full market value of the innovation. This is higher
than what it earns under I, but lower than what it earns under NIC since the ﬁrms are
14not allowed to collude. Solving the zero proﬁt condition and the ﬁrst innovator’s ﬁrst order





















o .F o rt h er i v a lﬁrms, the returns to investment are the highest
under NIC and the lowest under I. Thus, they invest the most under NIC and the least
under I.F o r t h e ﬁrst innovator, the case is a little bit more complicated. While choosing
its investment level, it also takes into account its expected proﬁts from losing in the second
race and invests more aggressively if its expected proﬁts from losing are low. Since it gets
zero under NINC if it loses the second race, the incentives to win the race are the highest
in that case.
3.1.2 No patenting
If the ﬁrst innovator chooses not to patent, we know it is not going to use the innovation for
commercial purposes since public disclosure of innovations restricts their patentability and
we assume reverse engineering is easy. If commercial use reveals the innovation fully, the
innovator would always prefer patenting to not patenting as long as it is going to oﬀer the
innovation for sale. Therefore, while calculating the returns from not patenting, we only need
to focus on the case when there is no commercialization.












λxw + µXo + r
− cxw.
This payoﬀ function diﬀers from (1) in two ways. First, if the ﬁrst innovation is not patented,
the rival ﬁrms’ hazard rate decreases. Second, the ﬁrst innovator cannot make any interim
proﬁts from the ﬁrst innovation until the second innovation is developed.








λxw + µXo + r
− cxi.
Solving for the investment levels, we get
xNP/I
w =








If the policy regime is NIC, the investment levels are
xNP/NIC
w =








Comparing these investment levels with the ones under patenting, we observe that under
both I and NIC, not patenting results in an increase in the investment of the ﬁrst innovator
and a decrease in the investments of the rival ﬁrms. Since the marginal beneﬁt of investment
decreases for the rival ﬁrms, they choose to invest less. For the winner of the ﬁrst race,
not patenting decreases the level of competition it faces in the R&D market. Moreover, it
decreases the payoﬀ the ﬁrst innovator will receive if it loses the second race. Thus, it has
incentives to invest more in order to increase its chances of winning.











16The rival ﬁrms still invest less than they would under patenting. For the winner of the ﬁrst




w if and only if (λ − µ)
2 v − cr2λ>0.T h eﬁrst innovator
invests more under no patenting for µ close to λ and invests less under no patenting for low
values of µ. This is because when the policy regime is NINC,t h eﬁrst innovator earns zero
if it loses the second race whether or not it patents. Therefore, when µ is high, it invests
more under no patenting than under patenting because under no patenting it is not making
any interim proﬁts and, thus, would like to win the second race as soon as possible. When µ
is low, it does not have to invest as much since it does not face as intense competition.
Before moving onto the analysis of the patenting decision, we can note a few things about














Under both patenting and no patenting, regime NIC results in the highest investment
level in the second R&D race. This result is driven by the investment incentives of the rival
ﬁrms since they have the highest incentives to invest under NIC. The incentives to invest
in the second R&D race are the lowest under policy regime I since it favors ﬁrst-generation





This is an intuitive result that is again driven by the investment incentives of the rival
ﬁrms. The rival ﬁrms’ investment is an increasing function of µ: ∂XNP
o /∂µ > 0.T h eﬁrst
innovator’s investment increases with µ for low levels of µ and decreases with µ for µ close
to λ. At the aggregate level, the eﬀect of µ on XNP
o dominates the eﬀect of µ on xNP
w .
In the following analysis, I mainly focus on the case where the aggregate investment of the
rival ﬁrms under both patenting and no patenting is always positive. Since their incentives
17to invest are the lowest under regime I, this assumption implies that λv > 4cr2 in case of
patenting and µ2v>8cr2λ in case of no patenting. Note that if µ is such that the ﬁrst
innovator can deter entry of the rival ﬁrms into the second R&D race by not patenting, it
will have much lower incentives to patent.
3.2 Patenting decision
Under the ﬁrst-to-invent rule, the innovator can delay its patenting decision without endan-
gering its right to patent. In such a setting, the beneﬁt of patenting is that the innovator can
start to make proﬁts from the innovation immediately. The beneﬁt of delaying patenting is
that it slows down the progress of rival ﬁrms. At the end of the ﬁrst R&D race, the winner
decides whether to patent by considering this trade-oﬀ.C l e a r l y ,µ,t h er i v a lﬁrms’ marginal
beneﬁt of investment in case of no patenting, plays a crucial role in the patenting decision.
Lemma 1 πNP
w is a decreasing function of µ.
Under all of the policy regimes, the proﬁts of the ﬁrst innovator under no patenting
decreases as µ increases. As µ increases, competition in the R&D market increases, which
drives the proﬁts of the ﬁrst innovator down. The ﬁrst innovator patents the ﬁrst innovation if
the rivals’ probability of success in the second R&D race in case of no patenting is suﬃciently
high. In other words, if the ﬁrst innovator can suﬃciently impair the positions of the rival
ﬁrms in the second R&D race by not patenting, it will choose not to patent. Let µI represent
the critical µ value such that for µ>µ I,t h eﬁrst innovator will choose to patent. We can
deﬁne µNIC and µNINC in a similar fashion.
Proposition 2 The ﬁrst innovator’s threshold for patenting is the lowest under regime I and
the highest under regime NINC: µI <µ NIC <µ NINC.
18Providing ﬁrst-generation innovators with strong protection increases their incentives to
patent. The regimes diﬀer in the amount of licensing fees patentholders can collect if a rival
ﬁrm develops an improved version of their innovation. If one of the rival ﬁrms wins the second
R&D race, the licensing fees that the ﬁrst innovator can collect are the highest under I and
equal to zero under NINC. Not patenting decreases the investment incentives of the rival
ﬁrms and relaxes the competition in the R&D industry. The ﬁrst innovator is less concerned
about the intensity of competition in the R&D market the higher the amount it will earn if it
loses the second race. Its incentives to patent are the highest under policy regime I because
it provides the innovator with the highest insurance against losing in the second R&D race.
Thus, we are likely to see patenting more frequently under regime I. There exists values
of µ for which the ﬁrst innovator chooses to patent under regime I w h i l ei tc h o o s e sn o tt o
patent under the other two policy regimes.
3.3 First race
We can now analyze the investment incentives in the ﬁrst R&D race. The prize to the winner
in the ﬁrst R&D race depends on the policy regime. If a ﬁrm loses the ﬁrst race, it can still
participate in the second R&D race. However, its expected proﬁt in the second race is zero
due to free entry.






where X1 represents the aggregate investment level in the ﬁr s tr a c ea n dπw represents the
winner’s expected proﬁt at the beginning of the second race. Due to free entry, the aggregate
investment levels can be determined by using the zero proﬁt conditions. Comparing these














Under both patenting and no patenting, we have the same ranking of the aggregate in-
vestment levels in the ﬁrst race. Since the winner of the ﬁr s tr a c eh a st h es t r o n g e s tp a t e n t
protection under regime I, it is going to have the highest investment incentives then. Com-









w . Since the winner of the ﬁrst race faces
stronger competition under NIC, its expected proﬁts are lower in that case. This causes the
investment level in the ﬁrst race under regime NIC to be relatively lower.
Comparing Proposition 1 and 3 reveals that allowing collusion favors second-generation
investors at the expense of ﬁrst-generation investors while having broad patent protection,
policy regime I,f a v o r sﬁrst-generation investors at the expense of second-generation investors.
We can also show that while investment in the second race increases with µ, investment in





An increase in µ increases the competition in the second R&D race. Consequently, it
aﬀects the investment level in the ﬁrst R&D race adversely.
3.4 Welfare Analysis
We assume the courts seek to maximize expected social welfare at the beginning of the ﬁrst
R&D race. Social welfare is deﬁned as the sum of producer surplus, consumer surplus, and
the non-appropriable values of the innovations. As pointed out in Arrow (1962), for a variety
of reasons investors may not always be able to appropriate for themselves the entire social
beneﬁt of their innovations. Let s ≥ 0 stand for the non-appropriable value of the innovations.
It represents the increase in social welfare that other ﬁrms may enjoy due to either knowledge
20spillovers or demand spillovers.18 Note that since we assume the innovators in our model are
able to capture the entire consumer surplus, s does not include any consumer surplus.
While writing the expected social welfare function, we should take into account the
spillovers between the ﬁrst and the second innovations. As pointed out in Chang (1995)
and Green and Scotchmer (1995), the social beneﬁt from an innovation should include the
option value of the subsequent innovations it inspires. The second innovation would not have
been possible without the ﬁrst one. Therefore, if the ﬁrst innovation is patented, the expected
social welfare can be expressed as















where P (X1)=λX1/(λX1 + r) and P (X2)=( λX2)/(λX2 + r). As in Denicolo (2000),
these expressions can be interpreted as the probability of innovating adjusted by the discount
rate.
Due to free entry, expected proﬁts are bid down to zero in both races. Social welfare





























































The extra term in WP/NINC represents the consumer surplus. If the ﬁrms are not allowed
to collude, there is competition between the ﬁrst and second innovators. Consumers receive
a surplus of v per period after the second innovation is developed. Consumer surplus exists
18In fact, Jones and Williams (1998) ﬁnd that the optimal R&D investment is at least two to four times of
actual investment.
21if and only if the second innovation is developed by one of the rival ﬁrms. This is the reason
we have λX
P/NINC
o instead of λX
P/NINC
2 in the numerator. Under policy regimes I and
NIC, the investors can capture all of the consumer surplus, which increases their willingness
to invest. Note that in this model, charging a price above marginal cost does not result in
any deadweight loss.

























































Under no patenting, since the ﬁrst innovator does not start to use the innovation for commer-
cial purposes until the second innovation is developed, the social beneﬁto ft h eﬁrst innovation
as well as the second innovation can only be realized after the second innovation is developed.
This is the main diﬀerence between the welfare functions under patenting and no patenting.
We ﬁrst analyze whether the ﬁrst innovator’s patenting decision is socially optimal. Since
in R&D race models the private incentives to invest may exceed the social incentives to invest,
disclosure of innovations, which increases the investment incentives of subsequent innovators,
may not always be desirable. However, Proposition 4 states that there is never over-patenting.
Proposition 4 Whenever the ﬁrst innovator decides to patent, it makes the socially optimal
choice.
In order to analyze the optimal policy, consider ﬁrst the case when µ is low. If the ri-
val ﬁrms’ probability of success in case of no patenting is suﬃciently low, there will not be
any patenting under any of the policy regimes. In that case, we need to compare WNP/I,
22WNP/NIC,a n dWNP/NINC.L e t slow stand for the value of s such that WNP/NIC =
WNP/NINC.
Proposition 5 For µI ≥ µ, WNP/NIC >W NP/I.M o r e o v e r ,WNP/NIC Q WNP/NINC as
s Q slow.
Since, for µI ≥ µ, social welfare is always higher under NIC than it is under I,i t
is never optimal to have regime I. This is because regime I gives the ﬁrst innovator the
strongest patent protection and it is not necessary to have such strong protection when the
ﬁrst innovator already protects itself by not patenting. Second-generation investors, on the
other hand, have substantially low incentives to invest under non-disclosure. Among the
three policy regimes, the incentives to invest in the second R&D race are the strongest under
NIC. Since the incentives to invest in the second R&D race are low when µ is low, having
non-infringement and allowing collusion may be optimal in order to encourage investment in
the second R&D race.19 We will see that this is the only case when it is optimal to allow
collusion.
Proposition 5 also states that allowing collusive licensing becomes optimal when the non-
appropriable value of the innovations is suﬃciently high. Since the aggregate investment
levels in both of the R&D races are higher under NIC than they are under NINC,a st h e
non-appropriable value of the innovations increases, a switch to NIC becomes desirable in
order to encourage investment in both races. This is the case despite the fact that when the
innovators are allowed to collude, consumer surplus is reduced.
For µI <µ , there will always be patenting under I.
19If µ is so low that the innovator can deter entry into the second R&D race by not patenting, there may
be more scope for allowing collusive licensing agreements because the rivals ﬁrms would have more incentives
to enter the second race under regime NIC than they would under the other two regimes.
23Proposition 6 If there is going to be patenting under policy regime I, it is never optimal to
allow collusion.
Although having strong patent protection discourages investment in the second R&D
race, social welfare is always higher under I than it is under NIC as long as there will be
patenting under regime I.20 Under both of the regimes, the innovating ﬁrms capture all of
the consumer surplus. Policy regime I favors ﬁrst-generation innovators while policy regime
NIC favors second-generation innovators. Proposition 6 states that in case of symmetric
innovations, having broad patent protection is socially preferable to having narrow patent
protection (no infringement) and collusion. Although having infringement provides ﬁrst-
generation innovators with strong incentives to invest at the expense of second-generation
innovators, having no infringement with collusion may provide second-generation innovators
with unnecessarily high incentives to invest because under NIC second-generation innovators
obtain a share of the ﬁrst innovator’s proﬁts.
The next proposition states that as the non-appropriable value of the innovations in-
creases, it becomes socially more beneﬁcial to have policy regime I, which transfers rents
from consumers to producers, than to have policy regime NINC.L e tsint and shigh stand
for the critical s values for intermediate and high values of µ respectively. We deﬁne them
by setting WP/I = WNP/NINC in each case.
Proposition 7 For µNINC >µ>µ I, WP/I Q WNP/NINC as s Q sint.F o r µ ≥ µNINC,
WP/I Q WP/NINC as s Q shigh.
When the ﬁrst innovator participates in the second R&D race and there is going to be
patenting under regime I, it becomes optimal to have regime I as the non-appropriable value
20It is important to keep in mind that we have been assuming that the innovations are symmetric. Having
ap o l i c yo fNIC may become more attractive if it is the case that the second innovation is a much more
signiﬁcant one than the ﬁrst one.
24of the innovations increases. Policy regime I provides the participants in the ﬁrst R&D
race with the highest incentives to invest. As the non-appropriable value of the innovations
increases, it becomes optimal to stimulate investment in the ﬁrst race. If the non-appropriable
value of the innovations is low, it is optimal to have NINC, which stimulates investment
in the second R&D race and allows consumers to beneﬁt from the competition between
sequential innovators.
We ﬁnally analyze how optimal policy changes as µ increases. The size of µ depends on
the government’s trade secret policy and the ﬁrms’ ability to monitor the ﬂow of their tech-
nological information. Clearly, diﬀerent industries may be characterized by diﬀerent values
of µ. That is, for the innovators, the eﬀectiveness of secrecy as a protection mechanism may
vary across industries. Proposition 8 implies that having strong patent protection becomes
less desirable as µ increases.
Proposition 8 For all values of µ, shigh >s int.
If the probability of imitation under secrecy is high, the innovator has increased incentives
to patent the innovation in order to protect itself. In fact, when µ is suﬃciently high, there
will be patenting under all of the policy regimes. The ﬁrst innovator will always choose to
patent the innovation since it cannot signiﬁcantly decrease the success rate of the rival ﬁrms
by not patenting. Therefore, it is not necessary to have strong patent protection in order to
encourage the disclosure of innovations and regime I becomes less attractive from the social
point of view. On the other hand, if the probability of imitation under secrecy is low, it
becomes more attractive to have strong patent protection in order to encourage disclosure.
These results indicate that it may be optimal to have strong patent protection even in
cases when several ﬁrms race to develop certain innovations if we endogenize the patenting
decisions of innovators. Narrower protection may be optimal, as it is Denicolo (2000), under
25a weak trade secret policy. However, in cases when secrecy is an attractive option for the
innovators, it is optimal to have broader patent protection. As far as collusive licensing
agreements are concerned, the results extend the ones in Chang (1995). Chang argues that
collusion should be allowed if the relative private value of the second innovation is signiﬁcantly
higher. In our case, collusion should be allowed if early innovators will prefer non-disclosure.
4C o n c l u s i o n
Innovators can try to protect their innovations by relying on either the patent system or
secrecy. Although the patent system provides innovators with the right to exclude others
from using the innovation for a ﬁxed period of time, it also requires them to disclose the
innovation. This paper emphasizes that while designing patent and antitrust policy, it should
be taken into consideration that early innovators may not always choose to patent. Attention
should be paid to how proﬁts are divided between diﬀerent generations of innovators as well
as to how to discourage early innovators from restricting the supply of new technologies to
other, possibly rival, ﬁrms.21
Three policy regimes have been compared in order to explore when courts should ﬁnd an
infringement and when they should allow collusive licensing agreements in case of competing
innovations. I have assumed that if an innovation is not patented, the ﬁrst-to-invent rule
applies. Under the ﬁrst-to-invent rule, innovators do not lose their ownership rights if they
do not patent an innovation immediately. The patenting decisions of innovators depend on
t h ee a s ew i t hw h i c hr i v a lﬁrms can learn about new technologies. This indicates that policy
21The trade-oﬀ that policy makers face between decreasing the incentives for initial innovations and increas-
ing the incentives for subsequent innovations while determining the optimal patent protection implies that
we may be facing a time-inconsistency problem as far as policy making is concerned. In terms of emerging
industries, while the policy makers may ﬁnd it optimal to pursue a strong patent protection policy in the
initial stages of the industries, their optimal policy may change as the industry ages. Unless they can credibly
commit to a single policy, the expectation that patents may not be as eﬀectively enforced in the future may
cause the R&D incentives of initial innovators to diminish.
26geared towards industries where innovators can rely on secrecy to protect their innovations
may be diﬀerent from policy geared towards industries where innovators cannot rely on
secrecy.
The main ﬁndings of the paper can be summarized as follows. Suppose we allow for
repeated innovation by the same ﬁrm. As far as disclosure is concerned, although second—
generation investors would have decreased incentives to invest under strong patent protection,
providing ﬁrst-generation innovators with strong protection increases their incentives to both
invest and patent. They have the highest incentive to patent under a policy of strong patent
protection, and the lowest incentive to patent under a policy of no infringement and no
collusion. Patenting allows them to make proﬁts from the ﬁrst innovation while they race
to develop the second innovation. However, it has the disadvantage of transferring crucial
technical information to rival ﬁrms. Since strong patent protection provides them with the
highest amount of insurance against losing in the second race, they have the highest incentives
to patent then.
Optimal patent policy depends on how viable an option secrecy is. If innovators cannot
rely on secrecy to protect their innovations, it is optimal to have relatively narrow patent
protection. This happens if the government has a weak trade secret policy or if innovators
cannot monitor the ﬂow of their technological information. If secrecy is a feasible option, it
becomes optimal to have relatively broad patent protection. This is because when innovators
cannot rely on secrecy to protect their innovations, they have increased incentives to patent
them and it is not necessary for the government to give them extra incentives to patent. In
the case when innovators always prefer secrecy over patenting, it becomes optimal to have
a ﬂexible antitrust policy rather than a ﬂexible patent policy. Since non-disclosure reduces
the investment incentives in the second R&D race, allowing collusive licensing agreements
between competing innovators becomes optimal in order to stimulate investment in the second
27R&D race. This implies that in such cases, policy should target encouraging investment in
future races rather than encouraging disclosure of past innovations.
The analysis can be extended in several ways by relaxing some of the assumptions we have
made. First, we have assumed that the ﬁrst-to-invent rule determines ownership. Currently,
there is a lot of debate on whether the United States should continue with its ﬁrst-to-invent
policy or adapt the ﬁrst-to-ﬁle policy to be in harmony with the rest of the world. Therefore,
we can analyze what a switch to the ﬁrst-to-ﬁle rule would imply in terms of optimal patent
policy. The ﬁrst-to-invent rule gives innovators more ﬂexibility about when to disclose their
innovations. Under the ﬁrst-to-ﬁle rule, innovators may feel more threatened and have higher
incentives to patent. Therefore, having strong patent protection may become less attractive.
Second, we have assumed that reverse engineering is very easy. Therefore, the ﬁrst innovator
never uses the innovation for commercial purposes in the case when it does not patent. If
reverse engineering is diﬃcult, this would allow the ﬁrst innovator to have a third option,
which is to keep the innovation secret and commercialize it at the same time. In such cases,
the innovator would have lower incentives to patent and the courts may ﬁnd it optimal to
have strong patent protection more frequently. Third, we have assumed that the second
innovation is always patentable. Whether the second innovation should be patentable is a
policy question that can be explored. Especially if the ﬁrst innovation is not patented, this
may make the second innovation more patentable. The government may decide whether to
make the second innovation patentable or not depending on the patenting decision of the ﬁrst
innovator.
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A Proof of Proposition 1






































µ2v − 6(λ − µ)cr2
2crλµ
.
Given the assumptions that aggregate investment by the rival ﬁrms in the second R&D race






























Since λ ≥ µ by assumption, the derivative is negative in all three cases.
32C Proof of Proposition 2
Setting πP
w − πNP
w =0under the three policy regimes, we ﬁnd:










µNINC =2 λ −
p
λv (cr2 + λv)
v
.
Clearly, µNIC >µ I.M o r e o v e r ,






















λv + cr2. Squaring both sides we get:




> 9λv +9 cr2.
Since X
P/I
0 > 0 implies λv > 4cr2, this inequality always holds. Therefore, µNINC >µ NIC.
From Lemma 1 it follows that for all values of µ greater than these critical µ values, there
will be patenting under the respective policy regimes.
D Proof of Proposition 3

















Given the assumption that aggregate investment by the rival ﬁrms in the second R&D race


























Again, given the assumptions that aggregate investment by the rival ﬁrms in the second R&D







E Proof of Proposition 4
It is necessary to show that πP
w >π NP
w implies WP >W NP under all three regimes. From









































hold under the condition for πP
w >π NP
w .













































.A g a i n ,





F Proof of Proposition 5
We have:




























which is positive assuming X
NP/I
o > 0.
From the expressions for WNP/NINC and WNP/NIC it is clear that when s =0 , WNP/NINC >


























































Taking the derivative with respect to s,w eh a v e
∂(WNP/NINC/WNP/NIC)


























´ . This term is < 1 for µI ≥ µ,s ow eh a v e
WNP/NINC <WNP/NIC.
G Proof of Proposition 6
We need to show that WP/I >W NP/NIC for µNIC >µ>µ I and WP/I >W P/NIC for
µ>µ NIC. For the latter case we have:




9λ2v2 − 13λvcr2 +2 c2r4¢
λv (9λv − 2cr2)(3λv − 2cr2)(3λv +2 cr2)
which is positive assuming X
P/I
o > 0.F o rµNIC >µ>µ I, we use numerical analysis to show
WP/I >WNP/NIC.
H Proof of Proposition 7
The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 5 and is not repeated here.
I Proof of Proposition 8











































































































.U s i n g t h e f a c t
that X
NP/NINC
o > 0 and µ>µ I, we can show that both inequalities hold.
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